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Despite considerable literature on the Bush administration’s war on terrorism
rhetoric, little attention has been paid to its discourse of moral disengagement,
leaving an important and still relevant gap that this paper aims to address.
Rather than approaching this gap in terms of an archival historical analysis
that is disconnected from the present, it proposes an exploratory revisit of the
rhetoric that the benefits of hindsight might enrich and, we argue, aid in
understanding connections to the current post-invasion turmoil and the gradual
ISIS takeover. Having subjected nineteen presidential speeches to qualitative
content analysis, we identified a number of moral disengagement mechanisms:
moral justification, advantageous comparisons, and attribution of blame,
dehumanisation of the enemy, the use of sanitizing language, diffusion of
responsibility and minimization of harm. We also identified novel themes
relating to American excellence/patriotism, religious ideals and fear- arousing
appeals, offering original contributions to the existing literature and advancing
our understanding of dynamic, real-world, and highest stakes moral
disengagement whose parallels can be identified in today’s political discourses.
The detailed analysis unveils the apparent paradox of propagating moral
disengagement through a thread of arguments that interweave diversity with
uniformity, complexity with simplicity, in effect alerting the reader to the
processes of moral desensitisation that the past, current and future
“warmongering” political discourses may often rely upon. Keywords: George
W. Bush, War, Terror, Terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Rhetoric, Political
Discourse, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, War on Terror, Speeches
When on the tenth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, 12 bombs wreaked havoc
within Shia areas of Baghdad, leaving 56 dead and 200 injured (Beaumont, 2013), their blasts
once again called into question the Bush administration’s War on Terror political script,
demonstrating the continued relevance of inquiry into this political narrative. Currently, that
legacy, combined with the Arab Spring, appears to have metastasized into what at the time of
writing this text seems like a virtual disintegration of the Iraqi state and the gradual ISIS
takeover, drawing renewed attention to the apparently never-fading importance of exploring
the rhetoric of warmongering. Although the analysed script is grounded in the institution of
American civil religion1 (Edwards & King, 2007) and appears to carry a message of absolute
righteousness, in this paper we shall analyse it in terms of a broader spectrum of moral
1

American civil religion is a term given to an assortment of beliefs, ideals, and rituals held by those who live in
the United States of America. Whilst initially this civil religion was based upon Christianity – due to an
overwhelming majority of Christians in society - it is not specifically Christian. Rather it exists alongside, the
assumptions of other distinct faiths (Bellah 1967).

1906

The Qualitative Report 2015

disengagement rather than a narrower 21st century sermon harking back to the medieval calls
for crusades.
Political speeches remain the backbone of modern ruling strategies and are the key to
political processes, agendas, and outcomes (Brown, 2009; Krebs & Jackson, 2007).
Presidential speeches in particular have been found to increase legislative success (Barrett,
2004; Canes-Wrone, 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006), influence public opinion and set public
agendas (Cohen, 1995, 1997; Hill, 1998; Lawrence 2002), providing evidence for a significant
connection between U.S. Presidential rhetoric, and increased public interest. Thus, presidential
speech content is central to attracting public interest and agenda-setting. Public attention can
be captured by compelling arguments that frame a specific problem into an issue of substantial
importance to the average person and high profile speeches dedicated to one policy problem
have been followed by a rise of that issue on the public’s agenda (Behr & Lyengar, 1985), the
result being that simple, but emotionally-charged speeches may be convincing enough to
change the public agenda or to direct the people’s attention in a selective manner. Grabias
(2001) further highlighted this in discussing politicians’ use of a process known as stylistic
competence, which refers to the careful choosing of words in order to suit specific situations
and current needs and as a means of boosting their own persuasiveness. Moreover, Wlodarek
(2010, p. 143) argued that politicians mould their speeches to the “receivers’ inter-textual or
cultural knowledge and beliefs so as to modify their points of view.”
Existing literature in the study of speech content highlights the importance of negative
information within political rhetoric (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010), suggesting that there are various
factors involved in persuasive communication, two of which play an important role in this
context: credibility of the communicator and fear-arousing appeals (Hovland, Janis & Kelley,
1953). The former refers to the notion that the level of persuasiveness is positively correlated
with perceptions of credibility, which might be strengthened and maintained by two essential
factors (i.e., becoming an expert in your field and appearing trustworthy). Whereas
trustworthiness can be measured by how much people perceive communicators as having the
intention to persuade or believe them to have something to gain, expertise is based on, among
other things, similarities in social background, such as values, status or beliefs, and also on
differences in (and perceptions of) age, experience and leadership (O'Quinn, 2009).
In relation to speech content and persuasiveness, Hovland et al. (1953) further noted
in extensive post-World War II research on communication and propaganda that the use of
threatening rhetoric and fear-arousing appeals, used particularly in times of an alleged military
threat posed by a construed enemy, to influence opinions and to receive public consent for a
chosen course of action, are most successful when promoted with a parallel desire to avoid
situations that could lead to danger and deprivation. Following this fear of danger and
deprivation, it has been found that political leaders will often attempt to put forward an agenda
during times of “moral panic” (Cohen, 1974, 2002, p. 1), such as wars, terrorist attacks or other
security threats, in the hope that the public will become more sympathetic to a single course of
action if they believe this agenda will lead to an increase in their well-being.
Moral panic refers to processes whereby a social problem or threat, real or imaginary,
is either highlighted or created and presented , by the media, in particular, as a threat to the
traditional morals and values of a society (Cohen, 2002). It has been identified that moral panic
is often present in times of decivilization, such as times of war, revolution, inflation or
umemployment, as these times quickly induce fear in the populus due to a perceived lack of
control in social events (Mennell & Goudsblom, 1998). Through a process of deviance
amplification the subject of the panic is viewed as a source of moral decline and social
disintegration (Jewkes, 2004). This results in the public feeling the need for protection against
the supposed problem or threat and more inclined to legitimize stringent and coercive measures
to achieve this (Altheide, 2009). Fear of threats, both known and unknown, can be expolited
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and manipulated by moral entrepreneurs (Becker, 1963) who claim to speak on behalf of the
public, but instead have an agenda of their own that they wish to promote. Such entrepreneurs
(including heads of states, such as Prime Ministers and Presidents) will further project the
problem onto the public, making it seem much larger and graver than it in fact is (Cohen,
2002).
Moral Agency and Moral Disengagement in a Time of Moral Panic
Drawing on the above, the current study will examine the use of mechanisms of moral
disengagement (Bandura, 1990) in presidential speeches given by George W. Bush (henceforth
referred to as Bush) in response to the threat of terrorism (particularly post 9/11), the
subsequent war on terror, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To clarify, moral agency is an individual’s ability to act based on judgements of right
or wrong which are commonly held to be true (Taylor, 2003). While it is acknowledged that
combat situations give rise to difficult dilemmas, as they lead not only to military casualties,
but also inevitably take a large civilian toll, the suspension of moral agency can be regarded as
extremely useful when a nation goes to war. Not only are changed conceptions of moral agency
useful in creating conditions conducive to garnering public support, but reduced moral agency
can also make it easier for soldiers to inflict destruction, suffering and death. (Bandura, 1990)
In the development of moral agency people establish standards and values of right and
wrong, which serve as normative guidelines for how to behave in social situations (McAlister,
Bandura & Owen, 2006). People judge and rate their actions against their own personal
standards and situational circumstances and for the most part behave in ways that bring them a
sense of satisfaction and pride (Bandura, 1986, 1991), using self-evaluation and self-sanction
to motivate and regulate their moral agency and conduct (McAlister et al., 2006). Thus,
selective moral disengagement allows people to conduct morally corrupt behaviour within the
same moral standards they have developed for themselves (McAlister et al., 2006).
There are various points or loci, at which moral disengagement occurs (Bandura,
1986). At the behaviour locus, people turn lethal means into benevolent ones through moral
justification, advantageous comparison and sanitizing language. As part of this process, violent
means are portrayed as socially and personally acceptable, supposedly serving some morally
worthy purpose. Advantageous comparisons promote immoral conduct by comparing one’s
own injurious actions as a means of preventing future atrocities of greater magnitude (Bandura,
1990, 1999). Sanitizing language is used to replace labels with negative connotations (Lutz,
1987; Smith, 2002), for example, when military personnel use phrases such as collateral
damage to describe civilian casualties and clean surgical strikes for military attacks, (Bandura,
1990, 1999).
At the agency locus, an individual’s accountability is removed through the
displacement and diffusion of responsibility. Displacement of responsibility is the dissociative
practice of obscuring or distorting the relationship between action and the effects they cause
(Bandura, 1990). The power of self-sanctions is mediated by the diffusion of responsibility
achieved through, for example, the division of labour. In essence, group decision making
enables people to behave inhumanely because no single individual feels responsible for
decisions arrived at collectively. This lends itself to a risky shift in decision making whereby
groups collectively act more harshly when “responsibility is obfuscated by a collective
instrumentality” (Bandura, 1990, p. 176). In turn, the minimization of the harm an individual’s
conduct may cause serves the purpose of distorting the reality of the effects of the damaging
behaviour. In this way these distortions serve to psychologically protect the individual for the
effects of their damaging behaviour.
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At the outcome locus, the injurious effects of detrimental conduct are disregarded,
distorted or misconstrued in order to reduce the possible psychological repercussions of the
actions. De-humanizing the other, by stripping them of all their human qualities and in some
cases bestowing upon them negative and bestial ones23, makes it easier to disengage moral
agency in subsequent interactions with this out-group (Haritos-Fatouros, 2002; Keen, 1986).
Similarly, blaming the other for causing their own suffering is another way of disengaging selfsanctions, allowing the aggressor to be seen, by themselves and others, as a victim forced into
a morally questionable, but situationally justifiable, course of action (Bandura, 2004).
The mechanisms of moral disengagement can also be very effective in the promotion
and occurrence of detrimental conduct by reducing an individual’s positive social behaviour
(Bandura et al., 1996, 1999), this is further supported in findings that high levels of moral
disengagement are directly linked to an increased sense of support for the use of military force
(McAlister et al., 2006; Peled-Elhanan, 2010). Specifically, it was found that military strikes
are deemed acceptable if they are seen to be morally justifiable, for example as natural
defensive and deterring reactions to atrocities committed by the enemy out-group (McAlister
et al., 2006).
Taking the above findings into consideration, we shall analyse the main speeches made
by Bush between 2001 and 2006 regarding responding to terrorism and the war on terror.
Although research on the war on terror discourse has covered membership categories (Leudar,
Marsland, & Nekvapil, 2004), strategic speech acts (Lazar & Lazar, 2004), grammar (Butt,
Lukin, & Matthiessen, 2004), informational accuracy and flow (Altheide, 2006; Kellner, 2007),
as well as metaphors (Lakoff, 2004), cultural symbols (Wallerstein, 2002) and reasoning
practices (Chang & Mehan, 2008), the focus on moral disengagement per se appears to have
been neglected. Addressing this serious deficit, the current research was conducted in order to
gain insights into the mechanisms of persuasion built into the rhetoric of Bush, specifically the
rhetoric regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the attacks of 11th September
2001. The aim of this analysis was to assess: (1) the use of mechanisms of moral
disengagement in this selection of speeches, (2) which specific mechanisms of moral
disengagement are used, (3) whether other mechanisms have been found embedded within the
speeches, and why these may be influential, and finally (4) the extent to which different
mechanisms of persuasion are used when addressing different populations
Method
This study consists of a series of Thematic Content Analyses (TCA). TCA is an
effective tool to examine large amounts of data in a systematic fashion, identify patterns and
trends within the data and explore individual, group, and social attention (Stemler, 2001). It is
“a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other
meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18).
Nineteen transcribed speeches were used, all of which were given by Bush between the
11th of September 2001 and the 11th of September 2006. The 19 speeches included in this
analysis were chosen based on their subject matter, which directly related to the war on terror,
the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq4.
Our analysis took a deductive approach starting with the theory of moral disengagement
which was used for initial coding purposes. The transcripts were read carefully and coded
“They become satanic fiends, gooks and other bestial creatures.” (Bandura, 2002)
Greek torturers trained by the military police were often reminded that their victims were worms that needed
crushing (Gibson & Haritos-Fatouros, 1986)
4
All of the speeches in this research can be retrieved from three websites www.americanrhetoric.com;
www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches; www.september11news.com.
2
3
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broadly using themes reflective of the theory of moral disengagement. These coded items were
systematically checked back and counted within the transcripts. Organizing the themes
according to the categories provided by Bandura (1996), and taking into account that speeches
may have different mechanisms of persuasion embedded within them depending on the
audience the speech was intended for, we also analysed the transcripts for topics not specified
by previous research. In the context of the present paper, and drawing on Chang and Mehan’s
(2008) exploration of Bush’s reasoning practices and argumentation system, we took a middle
ground approach that neither overemphasised thematic discourse at the broader social level nor
at the micro level of interaction. We selected the quotes presented in this paper on the basis of
how well they might help reveal an overall pattern of moral disengagement in Bush’s speeches
and how well they might encapsulate the essence of the discerned themes.
Analysis/Discussion
Although our analysis is qualitative, we also wanted to enrich our results by including
some very basic statistical information that might better contextualise our research. From a
total of 453 coded items, 300 (67%) were identified as relating to “mechanisms of moral
disengagement.” Moral justifications were most frequently used (accounting for 29% of the
total number of identified mechanisms). This was followed by dehumanization and attribution
of blame (23%) and advantageous comparison (12%). The remaining mechanisms of moral
disengagement (sanitizing language, diffusion/displacement of responsibility and
minimization of effects) account for less than 5% of the total number of mechanisms coded.

Moral Disengagement
3%
1%

Moral Justification

0%

Dehumanization /
Attribution of blame

11%
22%

63%

Advantageous
Comparison
Sanitizing Language
Diffusion / Displacement
of reponsibilty
Minimization of effects

The analysis also provides evidence of further themes within Bush’s speeches that may
arguably contribute to encouraging mechanisms of moral disengagement within audiences. A
total of 153 items (33%) were coded as “other” or “novel” mechanisms of persuasion designed
to influence people’s opinions and reduce self-sanctions. The three most prevalent of these
themes relate to the excellence of Americans and the U.S.A. (or Patriotism, 39% of novel
themes), the use of fear-arousing appeals with danger presented as clear and present (28%), the
description of progress brought about in the occupied countries thanks to the allied troops
(Military Success, 17%), and the use of religious metaphors (Religious Ideals, 16%).
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Novel Themes
16%
39%
17%

Patriotism
Fear arousing appeals

28%

Military Success
Religious Ideals

Moral Justification
Moral justification is the process of making detrimental behaviour seem acceptable by
portraying it as “serving socially worthy or moral purposes” (Bandura, 1999, p. 3). This process
is most useful during times of war (Kelman, 1973), as it is at these times when the morality of
killing must be redefined so that it can be carried out free from (or at least with minimal) selfcondemnation (McAlister et al., 2006). We found that Bush attempted to use moral
justification to try to convince people that they are fighting against ruthless oppression: “Less
than two years ago, determined enemies of America entered our countries, committed acts of
murder against our people” (Bush, 2003a). He also presented himself as protecting their
cherished values: “This is civilisation’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush, 2001b), arguing for preserving the world peace:
“We go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (Bush, 2001a).
Portraying himself as fulfilling a mission to save humanity from merciless servitude, “Iraq only
last year was controlled by a dictator who threatened the civilised world” (Bush, 2003a), he
tried to justify further engagement in combat operations by drawing on US army losses and
by ideologically vesting the operations with an aura of righteousness and supposedly speaking
on behalf of the killed troops in a war-supporting voice: “the best way to honour the sacrifice
of our fallen troops is to complete the mission and to lay the foundation of peace for generations
to come” (Bush, 2005b).
Advantageous Comparisons
Advantageous comparisons rely heavily on moral justifications by utilitarian standards
that exploit the contrast principle, which states that how behaviour is viewed depends largely
on that to which it is compared (Bandura et al., 1996). For example, in order to make the
invasion of Iraq morally justifiable, Bush was compelled to compare his actions with events
that appear negligible, using advantageous comparisons in several different ways. First the
non-violent means of resolving the conflict situation in the Middle East were presented as
ineffective and insufficient: “the world has tried economic sanctions...limited military
strikes...no fly zones...containment...sanctions [and] inspections” (Bush, 2002a), arguing that
a declaration of war is the only logical option left as all other ones have apparently failed. The
“witch-hunting” rhetoric is clear in the conclusion that the absence of evidence of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) is presented as evidence of Iraqi deceit rather than as evidence of
their absence. Thus, the inspectors’ unsuccessful attempts to confirm the presence of WMD
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are framed in terms of Saddam’s evasion and sinister trickery aimed at fooling the West. “This
is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that have never been accounted for, capable of
killing millions” (Bush, 2002a). The unambiguous references to the certain possession of
WMD, and calls for decisive action against the evil in Iraq reflect the rhetoric of Malleus
Maleficarum (1486), urging people to hunt down and battle witches and their magic. It is
noteworthy that such evilness is rooted in the allegedly monolithic terrorist character rather
than in sociological, economic, or political factors that remain completely unmentioned,
suggesting strategic deployment of social categories and selective denial (Palasinski, Abell, &
Levine, 2012).
Secondly, the portrayal of supposed threats - acts of violence and inhumanity carried
out by America’s adversaries in the Middle East - is used to bolster the belief that in the long
term, a US (pre-emptive) military intervention would stave off more human suffering than it
might potentially cause in the short term:
The surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where
he lives and plans. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today
so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities. (Bush,
2003b);
“If we’re not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle.
They would be plotting and killing Americans” (Bush, 2005a).
Furthermore, in relation to these ideas of the utility and necessity of war to protect not
only America but the free world more generally, Bush used extensive examples of America’s
involvement in international conflict to demonstrate the supposed greater good of such action.
It is noteworthy here that appeals to history offer a sense of continuity to experience and
rationality to action, often illustrating thoughts, opinions and ideologies as part of a shared
group identity (Bhatia, 2007). Using words and phrases to remind people of the atrocities
committed during the reign of notorious dictators: “a civilized world knows very well that other
fanatics in history – from Hitler, to Stalin to Pol Pot – consumed whole nations in war and
genocide before leaving the stage of history” (Bush, 2005b); and the role that America played
in bringing these inhumanities to an end, Bush attempted to connect with past wars and bring
them into the foreground, presumably for the benefit of the 24.5 million war veterans that were
living in the USA in 2005 (U.S Census Bureau, 2005). Arguably, this would not only increase
the likelihood of war veterans being more supportive of the war, but might also contribute to
the persuasion of others, particularly as war veterans are seen as credible and expert sources of
information on what could happen if the war is not supported (O’Quinn, 2009).
Attribution of Blame & Dehumanisation of the Enemy
The attribution of blame in Bush’s rhetoric focused on the portrayal of America as being
“dragged reluctantly” into a conflict to deal with a global terrorist threat: “We did not ask for
the present challenge, but we accept it” (Bush, 2002a). This process aims to depict Americans
as being faultless victims “driven to injurious conduct by forcible provocation” (Bandura,
1999, p. 203). Violent reactions to such provocations can thereby be seen as reasonable,
excusable and defensible: “As long as terrorists and their allies plot to harm America, America
is at war” (Bush, 2003a). Attributing blame to the adversary is important to the creation of a
discourse supportive of a course of action that involves further conflict and also serves the
manipulation of how those being blamed are viewed, not only by others, but also by
themselves: “No act of ours invited the rage of killers” (Bush, 2005b).
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Research has shown that when victims are plausibly and convincingly blamed for the
suffering they are experiencing, they may eventually come to accept, believe and incorporate
these negative characteristics into their self-concept (Hallie, 1971), ultimately resulting in them
also attributing blame to themselves. From an observer’s perspective, if a victim is seen to be
responsible for their suffering, it can lead to them receiving further condemnation from others.
Bush frequently used a discourse that supports dehumanisation of the enemy and does so in
ways comparable to those previously used during the Twentieth Century during times of war
and genocide. Such apparent effectiveness of dehumanization strategies in reducing the
amount of remorse, regret, pity, or empathy felt for an out-group, is well documented (see for
example Dutton, 2007) and is used to justify the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes.
The strength of a person’s self-censure can in part depend on how that person views the
others who are being mistreated (Bandura et al., 1996). During the course of our lives, we have
interpersonal experiences with many different people, resulting in joy, pain, excitement or
suffering, and it is these experiences that create a foundation for empathy for others (McAlister
et al., 2006). The more we can identify with a person or people, the more responsive we are to
their emotions (McAlister et al., 2006). Therefore, when a nation goes to war, it is the job of
its leaders to ensure that its population identifies as little as possible with the people of the
country being invaded, which can be facilitated by attempts to dehumanise the other (Bandura,
1999). McAlister et al., (2006) found that dehumanization of the enemy is the most effective
factor in facilitating moral disengagement, as it makes it much easier to inflict pain, suffering
and death upon those not seen as human (Keen, 1986; Staub, 2003). The forms of
dehumanization found to be effective range from bestializing the enemy, to characterizing the
enemy as “inherently evil” and “devoid of any moral sense” (McAlister, 2006, p. 160).
In his speeches, Bush uses dehumanization to portray his adversaries as mindless
savages and cowardly yet dangerous barbarians without any moral scruples: “Just last week
they massacred children and their parents at a toy giveaway ... this is an enemy without
conscience” (Bush, 2005a); monsters devoid of any form of morality, feelings, or religion:
The terrorists kidnapped a young boy from the hospital and killed him .... In Tal
Afar, the terrorists have schools for kidnapping and beheading and laying
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). One Iraqi teenager was taken from his
family and routinely abused and violated - he was given the chance to prove his
manhood by holding the legs of a captive whilst he was beheaded. (Bush,
2006b)
He also refers to them as disenfranchised nomads whose only faith lies in acts of blowing
themselves and others up: “These people don’t have tanks. They don’t have ships. They hide
in caves. They send suiciders (sic) out.” (Bush, 2002b). With respect to this mechanism of
dehumanization, Bush seems to prefer to use metaphors of barbarity to describe the outgroup5
enemy and distinguish it from the West, which is described as civilised and wanting nothing
more than safety and dignity, “The civilized world is rallying to America’s side” (Bush, 2001b)
Sanitizing Language, Displacement & Diffusion of Responsibility and Minimization of
Harm
The final three mechanisms of moral disengagement were used in a limited capacity,
and in total accounted for less than 5% of the total number of mechanisms identified. To
clarify: sanitizing language is used to rename violent and detrimental actions to convey
5

An “outgroup” in this context is a social group with whom you do not identify.
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respectability and moral correctness (Bandura, 1990). Displacement of responsibility is the
distortion of the relationship between actions and the effects they cause (Bandura, 1990) which
can be achieved through the diffusion of responsibility; “when everyone is responsible, no one
really feels responsible” (Bandura et al., 1996, p. 365).
McAlister et al., (2006) argue that moral sanctions are reduced if the destructive effects
of the subsequent behaviours are sufficiently diminished, and that these reductions can lead to
increased support for military force. The possible reason behind the non-existence of the
minimization of destructive effects within presidential speeches may be because “[W]ith the
advent of satellite transmission, battles are now fought over collateral damage in the airways
to shape public perceptions of military campaigns and debates about them” (McAlister et al.,
2006, p. 159). This means that news reporters and television footage now control what people
see in terms of injurious conduct and the effects of the war, the result being that such negative
effects have arguably no place in the President’s speech. Thus, the military, the President and
the government can effectively control what the public is exposed to as the U.S. military have
“banned cameras and journalists from battlefield areas in the middle east” (McAlister et al.,
2006, p. 159) in an attempt to minimize the leakage of reputation-tarnishing Abu-Ghraib style
images, lending weight to Bandura’s (2004) argument that television has become a vital tool
in the social containment of moral disengagement.
The minimal use of diffusion and displacement of responsibility and sanitizing
language can furthermore be attributed to the fact that these mechanisms act mainly to absolve
combatants and those directly involved in creating military campaigns of any responsibility for
the destruction that they cause (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Bandura, 2004). Arguably, then,
as the general public is not involved in devising strategies of attack or military campaigns,
these mechanisms of moral disengagement are less relevant to disabling self-sanctions and
increasing support for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, in this study we found that
on the few occasions in which these particular mechanisms of moral disengagement were used,
it was a military audience that Bush was addressing (over 50% of the occurrences of diffusion
and displacement of responsibility were used when addressing a military population).
Importantly, minimization of destructive effects is a main contributor to the lowering of selfsanctions in the use of military force, which may be controlled via the mass media, as was seen
during the Vietnam War when U.S. military banned cameras and members of the press from
the battlefield in order to control the images seen by the American public (McAlister et al.,
2006).
Novel Themes:
1. American patriotism. The theme identified as the most common within Bush’s
speeches and which did not directly fit with Bandura’s theory of moral
disengagement, was termed “American Patriotism” and accounted for 39% of the
novel themes coded. Within this theme are ideas of American excellence in relation
to its population and military prowess, comprising a range of references to courage,
skill, strength, compassion, perseverance, dedication and service:
I am privileged to be in the presence of so many courageous military
families, who have borne the hardships of war with dignity and
devotion. By supporting a loved one in uniform, you are serving our
country and America is grateful for your service and your sacrifice.
(Bush, 2006a)
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2. Fear-arousing appeals: A clear and present danger. A further novel mechanism
of persuasion is anchored around instilling fear in the hope that it will increase support
for the wars in the Middle East in general. This mechanism accounts for 28% of the
novel themes coded and is focused on the notion that the enemy is a clear and present
threat because of its actions and supposedly ubiquitous military presence. This
mechanism is based on the idea of the existence of some form of universal danger from
which nobody anywhere is safe: “This violence is directed...against anyone” (Bush,
2003b). Fear-arousing appeals or the use of fear as a mechanism of persuasion is
deemed useful in relation to the effectiveness of persuasive communication to change
the public opinion (Hovland et al., 1953). Statements made by Bush, such as “[we are]
facing clear evidence of peril” (Bush, 2002a) and “we know they are preparing to attack
us again” (Bush, 2004) depict a dangerous situation - a threat from which nobody is
safe, illustrating the use of fear-arousing appeals to gain support for decisive military
action. Similarly, Janis and Feshbach (1953) offer an explanation for the effect of fear
on persuasion in terms of fear-drive theory, stating that messages tailored to induce a
state of fear or anxiety in turn result in an internal drive to reduce such feelings. Thus,
repetitions of fear-arousing appeals serve as reinforcement to encourage a favoured or
promoted course of action as a means of dispelling this fear.
In relation to this clear and present threat, the military presence of the enemy
and their potential to attack at will is promoted to encourage support for decisive
military reaction from the United States: “Two months after our operation to clear the
city, the terrorists had returned to continue their brutal campaign of intimidation.”
(Bush, 2006b). By using terms such as trained, recruited, indoctrinated and tactics it
is indicated that the adversary goes through a specialised recruitment process similar to
Western military forces and that they are highly trained and skilled in ways that might
(at least on some level) possibly rival the allied forces. By using values as descriptions,
such as thousands, Bush exaggerates the size of the force being commanded by the
terrorists and their whereabouts: “Terrorists are recruited from their own nations and
neighbourhoods and ... are trained in the tactics of terror” (Bush, 2001b). Providing
accounts of the places that have been attacked and by describing the attacks as an
offensive strike, Bush depicts the enemy as being highly organised, strategic, and coordinated, the implication being that it is capable of carrying out multiple co-ordinated
strikes: “al Qaeda and its associates trained, indoctrinated, and sent forth thousands of
killers to set up terror cells in dozens of countries, including our own.” (Bush, 2004).
Finally, by indicating how the enemy forces came back to reclaim the city after it had
been cleared to continue their campaign, Bush attempts to make it clear that this enemy
is not only untiring and devoted to their cause, but also large in numbers, and will not
stop until its goal has been reached: “We have seen a new terror offensive with attacks
on London and Sharm el-Sheikh, another deadly strike in Bali; and this week, a series
of bombing in Amman, Jordan.” (Bush, 2005b).
Military success. Bush also makes multiple references to the progress that the allied
troops have made in the Middle East and changes resulting from this (17% of novel
themes). Depicting the effects of the war as actually making a difference and having a
positive effect on both the country and its residents is used to reduce the chances of
people (both military personnel and the general population) reconsidering their support
of the war. This can be illustrated by the following example referring to progress,
completely omitting destroyed infrastructure, regular sectarian violence, frequent
power shortages and rampant corruption (Beaumont, 2013), to name just a few
unintended long-term consequences:
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When I spoke here a year ago, Iraqis still had a transitional government
that was operating under administrative law issued before the restoration
of sovereignty. Today, Iraqis have a permanent government chosen in
free elections under a democratic constitution that they wrote and they
approved. And the Iraqi people have a courageous leader in Prime
Minister Maliki, who has formed the cabinet and laid out a clear agenda
for the people of Iraq. (Bush, 2006a)
Offering examples of positive changes produced in the Middle East and framing
these as a positive result of the US-led military intervention, while skipping the
unintended consequences, raises the issue of “psychological traps” (Rubin & Brockner,
1985). Psychological traps refer to instances where an individual, after joining or
supporting a specific cause with the aim of reaching a goal, realises that the process of
achieving this goal requires repeated action, without the goal actually getting any
closer. After a time, the individual may find themselves having to make a decision;
either to continue investing in a cause which seems to bear no fruits, or abandon the
cause and with it everything that has been invested so far. Seeing progress being made,
and constantly being reminded of that progress, means that people can see their goal
getting closer, the effect being that the taken course of action appears to be right (Rubin
& Brockner, 1985) - an illusion that military personnel and civilians alike are
susceptible to.
Religious ideals. The use of religious language and metaphors is a further theme
(accounting for 16% of the novel themes) that advances the previous research on moral
disengagement and is used to justify military action and to persuade others of the US
righteousness. It is noteworthy that religion is probably one of the oldest justifications
used for mass detrimental conduct, the most notable example being Pope Urban II’s
calls for the Holy Crusades at the end of the Eleventh Century:
On this account I, or rather the Lord, beseech you as Christ's heralds to
publish this everywhere and to persuade all people of whatever rank,
foot-soldiers and knights, poor and rich, to carry aid promptly to those
Christians and to destroy that vile race from the lands of our friends. I
say this to those who are present, it meant also for those who are absent.
Moreover, Christ commands it. All who die by the way, whether by land
or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission
of sins. (Jacques Bongars, translated in Thatcher & McNeal, 1905)
Although Bush does not use such overt justification as Urban II, he does use metaphors,
such as evil and darkness to characterize not only what he believes to be the
overwhelming group and individual characteristics of the construed enemy, but also
what he would like others to believe:
The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning
further acts, are evil people. They don’t represent an ideology; they don’t
represent a legitimate political group of people. They’re flat evil. That’s
all they can think about, is evil. (Bush, 2001c)
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As we can see from this statement, Bush presents the word “evil” as a type social
categorization and uses adjectives such as very and worst to increase the portrayal of
terrorists as being the opposite of everything that the “nation of good folks” (Bush,
2001c) stands for (Bhatia, 2007, p. 511). The adjective flat is further used to emphasize
the evil nature of the terrorist, whilst at the same time disallowing them any way to
justify their actions, indicating that they are in fact “evil” by nature, not consequence”
(Bhatia, 2007, p. 511). These descriptions further increase the us versus them divide,
ultimately decreasing the amount of empathy any American or European might feel for
the enemy.
Also embedded within the topic of religious metaphor is the concept of light
versus dark “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for
freedom...no one will keep that light from shining” (Bush, 2001a). The concept of
“Manichaean discourse emphasizing the eternal duality between the co-eternals good
and evil” (Bhatia 2007, p. 517) is extremely prominent in the rhetoric of Bush. This
concept puts into effect the above-mentioned metaphor by implicating a biblical
concept of heaven and hell: “You defeat an ideology of darkness with an ideology of
hope and light. And freedom and liberty are part of an ideology of light” (Bush, 2006c).
Furthermore, and as Bhatia (2007) points out, such terms used by Bush carry
connotations with leadership, justice, triumph, courage and a general universal
goodness, whereas his metaphors of darkness carry connotations of deceit, secrecy,
cruelty and defeat. The use of religious language and justification is well implemented
by Bush, as he and his speech writers were undoubtedly aware that in 2001 over 75%
of the entire population of the United States of America were part of the Christian faith
(Kosmin & Keysar, 2009), the point being that the possibility of provoking a strong
reaction by using such rhetorical incentives could be exceedingly high.
Conclusion
Having drawn on Bush’s war on terror rhetoric and subjected 19 of his speeches to
thematic content analysis, in this article we critically considered the rhetoric of Bush through
the lens of moral disengagement. Thus, we aimed to address an important and current gap by
carefully unpacking a number of complex, subtle and context-dependent mechanisms of moral
disengagement (including moral justification, advantageous comparisons, attribution of blame,
dehumanisation of the enemy, as well as the use of sanitizing language, diffusion of
responsibility and minimization of harm). We also took account of novel themes, like
American excellence/patriotism, fear-arousing appeals and religious ideals which support and
complement both the existing research and the ongoing, evolving and shape-shifting war on
terror script that recent terrorist attacks, such as the Boston marathon bombing, contributes to
keeping alive.
Further work in this area of understanding is needed. Not only do we need to understand
the rhetoric and processes of moral disengagement that can be embedded in rhetoric for the
purposes of promoting and gaining support for war, and other forms of decisive military action,
it is imperative that we also look more closely at media amplification (Jewkes, 2004) of attacks,
and the threats and portrayal of those believed to be involved in this. The concern of moral
panics is not about dismissing the reality of a threat but rather the problems associated with
amplifying the threat out of all proportion, in particular the long term and far-reaching
repercussions of threat amplification are arguably evident in relation to the war on terror which
has resulted in a long and protracted occupation of foreign territory with little sense of
resolution or of the achievement of the original stated aims (i.e., to win a war on terror).
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In turn, focusing on understanding the relevance, weight and importance of political
rhetoric of this nature may be used effectively to equip entrepreneurs of peace with a greater
awareness of such rhetorical nuances, thus enabling improved counter-rhetoric, the importance
of which is continuously highlighted in attempts to win the hearts and minds of supporters of
any perspective?
This might be applied in instances such as British Prime Minister David Cameron’s call
for the renewal of the nuclear weapons deterrent against the danger that North Korea allegedly
poses to Britain. The awareness of such processes is fundamental to keeping us apart from
those who promote indiscriminate death and to supporting the pillars of freedom on which our
democracies rest.
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